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UPHOLDING FREE SPEECH AND PRIVACY
ONLINE: A LEGAL-BASED AND MARKET-BASED
APPROACH FOR INTERNET COMPANIES IN
CHINA
Yutian Lingt
Abstract
China is well known for its Internet-monitoring and censorship
efforts. As Internet technology and the online culture develop, the
Chinese government continues its efforts to control content and
communications. It forces both domestic and foreign Internet
companies that want to do business in China to censor content and
reveal the private information of users upon request. There has been
much discussion in the international community on how to prevent
non-state actors, such as transnational corporations, from violating
human rights. The situation in China is uncommon in that it is
government coercion and not simply the will of the corporation that
leads to free speech and privacy violations. This paper discusses a
two-prong approach to move toward more freedom of expression and
privacy rights within China's Internet system. The first prong consists
of an international corporate code of conduct, such as the Global
Network Initiative, that provides guidelines on how to resist
government attempts to violate the rights of users. This code must
have a wide range of unified participants and a strong reporting and
accountability system. The second prong is a market-based approach
that focuses on innovation of technologies to overcome censorship,
better consumer relations, and fostering a strong online community.
Companies that provide better products and that protect the interest
t Yutian Ling was a Ropes & Gray Public Interest Fellow at the Matsunaga Institute for
Peace and Conflict Resolution and the Institute for Asian-Pacific Business Law at the University
of Hawai'i in Manoa from 2009-2010. I would like to thank Ropes & Gray, the staff at both
institutes and the University of Hawai'i for providing the resources to complete this research
project. In particular, I want to thank Professors Carole Petersen, Charles Booth, and Brien
Hallett for reviewing the drafts, and Professor Danielle Conway for collaborating on the
presentation of this paper. Parts of this paper have been presented at University of Hawai'i
seminars and for the International Law Section of the Hawai'i State Bar Association.
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and freedom of users will gain market share in China and thus have
more influence over industry regulation. Although China has
managed to prevent economic freedom from significantly influencing
political reform, greater freedom on the Internet will likely lead to
incremental changes in civil and political rights. By combining these
two prongs, a strong international network of companies backed by
an emerging standard of business conduct can protect freedom of
speech and privacy while still providing a robust online world for the
Chinese people.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
After the death of Mao Zedong, China embarked on a slow
march towards economic openness with the outside world. Spurred on
by the disastrous results of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping
introduced four modernizations in 1978 designed to spur economic
growth in China: improving economic management, economic
cooperation with other countries, adoption of advanced technologies,
and improvements in science and education.' The result was 30 years
of unprecedented growth. GDP increased over 13 times between 1978
and 2006, the per capita income increased dramatically, and over 200
million people were elevated above the poverty line.2 Along with
increased prosperity came economic freedom: the right to privately
invest; the ability to move from place to place, to travel, or to seek
employment; and more choices in goods and services.3 In the midst of
this economic upheaval, the Chinese government still tightly
restricted political and civil rights to maintain single party control.4
In 1994, China opened itself up in another way. In that year the
first international Internet connection was established in China.5
Much of the Western world started using the Internet in the 1980s so
China had to play catch-up. And catch up it did. China's adoption of
the Internet rapidly increased in the 2000s. By the end of 2009, China
had about 384 million Internet users, surpassing the United States
1. Clem Tisdell, Economic Reform and Openness in China: China's Development
Policies in the Last 30 Years, 39 ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 271,275-76 (2009).
2. Id at 282-83.
3. Id. at 283.
4. See, e.g., Mary E. Gallagher, "Reform and Openness" Why China's Economic
Reforms Have Delayed Democracy, 54 WORLD POL. 338 (2002).
5. See, e.g., Martyn Williams, A Brief History of the Internet in China, IDG NEWS
SERVICE, May 17, 2004,
http://www.pcworld.idg.com.au/article/128099/china celebrates 10_years beingconnected int
emet/?pp=2&fp=2&fpid=l.
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(US) as the country with the most people online.6 This rapid growth
in Internet usage is attributed to several factors, including China's
rapid economic development, a government effort to incorporate
technology into the economic and governmental infrastructure, and
immense popularity of the technology.7 This proliferation of Internet
usage did not go unnoticed by the Chinese government. For many
years, the Communist Party of China (CPC) controlled and censored
political dialogue that it considered a threat to party rule.' Realizing
that this new communications medium immensely broadened the
reach and power of any speaker, the CPC sought to tame it. The CPC
has employed technological, legal, and psychological tools to control
online content and discourse. 9 This vast effort to control the Internet
is known as the "Great Firewall of China."o Even in the face of
continued criticism from much of the international community, China
persists in its Internet monitoring efforts.
The Chinese government is not accomplishing all of this by
itself. It is also co-opting both domestic and foreign Internet
businesses to aid in its censorship efforts." The Chinese government
requires companies to censor sensitive topics and makes them
promise not to disseminate information that spreads superstition or
12
obscenity or jeopardizes state security and social stability.
Companies such as Yahoo!, Microsoft, Google, and Skype have all
submitted to the CPC's demands in order to do business in China. 13
The US government was not pleased that US-based companies were
kowtowing to Chinese censorship demands, and Congress held
6. CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER, THE 25TH STATISTICAL SURVEY
REPORT ON INTERNET DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 11, (2010), available at
http://www.cnnic.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2010/3/15/142705.pdf [hereinafter CINIC].
7. Id. at 11-12.
8. See generally Mindy K. Longanecker, No Room for Dissent: China's Laws Against
Disturbing Social Order Undermines Its Commitments to Free Speech and Hamper the Rule of
Law, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 373 (2009).
9. See Congressional - Executive Commission on China, Prior Restraints,
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/exp/exppriorrestraints.php (last visited Feb. 5, 2011)
[hereinafter CECC, Prior Restraints].
10. Miriam D. D'Jaen, Breaching the Great Firewall of China: Congress Overreaches in
Attacking Chinese Internet Censorship, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 327, 330 (2008).
11. Justine M. Nolan, The China Dilemma: Internet Censorship and Corporate
Responsibility, 4 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 4 (2009).
12. See e.g., Ben Elgin & Bruce Einhorn, The Great Firewall of China, BUSINESS WEEK,
Jan. 12, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jan2006/tc20060112_434051 .htm.
13. Id.
2011] 177
178 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 27
hearings to interrogate the conduct of those companies.14 Congress
also considered passing the Global Online Freedom Act (GOFA) to
regulate US-based Internet companies' conduct abroad." US
companies are thus caught in a vice between the demands of the
Chinese government and the criticisms of the US government and
human rights organizations.
Traditionally, international law dealt with state actors only.'6 All
business ventures were seen as extensions of the state.' 7 As global
commerce has evolved, corporations have become larger, richer, more
powerful, and less controlled by the state in which they are based.
Such transnational corporations (TNCs) are capable of violating
human rights with impunity. How TNCs can be regulated is a
conundrum with which the international community continues to
struggle. The United Nations (UN) has made several efforts to
regulate TNCs, including creating the Global Compact and debating
passing norms on the responsibilities of TNCs in regards to human
rights.' 8 Yet monitoring and enforcement is still a problem.
The case of Chinese Internet censorship is slightly different from
other conflicts between TNCs and human rights. While many
companies tend to violate labor laws, environmental laws, and other
human rights if left to their own devices, Internet companies usually
do not censor information on their own accord.19 This creates an
opportunity to enlist Internet companies to help promote freedom of
speech and privacy rather than fight them. TNCs have a lot of
influence and economic power, which can help spur social and
political change. This paper outlines a two-prong approach to
14. See The Internet in China: A Tool for Freedom or Suppression? J. Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on
Afr. Global Human Rights and International Operations and the Subcomm. on Asia and the
Pacific ofthe Comm. on International Relations, 109th Cong. 109-157 (2006); Global Internet
Freedom: Corporate Responsibility and the Rule of Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
Human Rights and the Law, I10th Cong. J-1 10-93 (2008), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 110senate hearings&docid=f:45688.pdf.
15. Global Online Freedom Act 2006, H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter
GOFA]; see also Anne Cheung & Rolf H. Weber, Internet Governance and the Responsibility of
Internet Service Providers, 26 Wis. INT'L L.J. 403, 474-75 (2008).
16. Carlos M. Vasquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations Under
International Law, 43 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 927, 932-933 (2005).
17. Id.
18. Surya Deva, UN's Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises: An Imperfect Step in the Right Direction?, 20 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L.
493, 494 (2004).
19. Cheung & Weber, supra note 15, at 407-08.
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protecting free speech and privacy of users which envisions Internet
companies as allies instead of enemies to be controlled. The first
prong is a legal-based approach consisting of an international code of
conduct that outlines the best practices that a company should follow
to prevent censorship and violation of user privacy. The second prong
is a market-based approach that emphasizes improving customer
service, implementing products that innovate around censorship, and
fostering a strong online community and culture. Building a strong
economic and social presence in China can help push the CPC to
make incremental political and civil reforms.
Part 2 of the paper gives a brief history of the Internet in China
and the methods that the CPC uses to monitor it. Part 3 of the paper
outlines the international human rights standards for freedom of
speech and protection of privacy, both traditionally and on the
Internet. The conflict between US Internet companies operating in
China and Congress will also be discussed. Part 4 of the paper details
the two-prong approach described above for enlisting the help of
Internet companies to protect the rights of users online. Part 5 of the
paper concludes by noting some challenges in moving towards a free
Internet and what should be done to achieve that goal.
2.0 BACKGROUND
2.1 A BriefHistory of the Internet in China
The precursor to the Internet was first used in 1969 by the US
government as a means for scientific researchers and the military to
communicate and collaborate with each other. 20 During the 1970s and
1980s, the system went from being a closed one to an open one that
spread across the world. 2' Beginning in the early 1990s, the Internet
became an everyday tool for people to communicate, share, and
22
engage in commerce.22 Although China developed and used digital
communications systems in the 1980s, it did not officially connect to
the global Internet until 1994 through the China Science and
Technology Network.2 3 Initially, only about 23,000 people, mostly
government officials and academics, were able to access the
20. William J. Cannici, Jr., The Global Online Freedom Act: A Critique of its Objectives,
Methods, and Ultimate Effectiveness Combating American Businesses that Facilitate Internet
Censorship in the People's Republic of China, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 123, 127 (2007).
2 1. Id.
22. Id. at 127-28.
23. See Ronald J. Deibert, Dark Guests and Great Firewalls: The Internet and Chinese
Security Policy, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 143, 146 (2002).
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Internet.24 Since then, with strong government promotion of the
Internet's commercial uses, the number of Chinese users has
exploded. The Chinese have developed a very robust Internet culture
complete with blogs, bulletin boards, game networks, and rapidly
spreading Internet memes. The demographics of the Chinese Internet
community skew towards the young (61.5% of users are under 30
years old), urban (72.2% of users lived in cities), and are mostly white
collar workers (46.3% of all users) or students (33.2% of all users).25
2.2 China's Great Firewall
This rapid growth of the Internet in China did not catch the CPC
by surprise. From the very beginning, the government realized that
the Internet could be used to spread anti-government messages and
other topics disfavored by the CPC. The government intended to
retain as much control as possible over the content and activities of
domestic users.26 In 1995, China was already employing filtering
technology to block certain websites including those affiliated with
the Economist, CNN, the New York Times, human rights groups,
dissidents, pro-democracy groups, and the Falun Gong.27 All Internet
users were required to submit a lengthy application in which personal
information was disclosed and the applicant pledged not to use the
Internet in a way contrary to party demands. 28 The CPC utilized three
main methods to monitor the use of the Internet: (1) legal and
regulatory methods, (2) technological methods, and (3)
social/psychological methods.
2.2.1 Legal and Regulatory Methods
Theoretically, the Chinese Constitution protects the rights of
freedom of speech and privacy. Article 33 of the Chinese
Constitution, which outlines state citizenship, was amended in 2004
to include a statement that the "State respects and preserves human
rights." 2 9 Article 35 states that Chinese citizens "enjoy freedom of
speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of
demonstration. 0o Article 40 protects the privacy of correspondence
24. Id.
25. CINIC, supra note 6, at 20-25.
26. Deibert, supra note 23, at 147.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 148.
29. XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 33, § 4 (1982) (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.usconstitution.net/china.html.
30. Id. at art. 35.
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of citizens, stating that "[n]o organization or individual may, on any
ground, infringe on citizens' freedom of privacy of correspondence,
except in cases where to meet the needs of state security or of
criminal investigation, public security or procuratorial organs are
permitted to censor correspondence in accordance with procedures
prescribed by law."3 1
In reality, there are a litany of government agencies that
cooperate to oversee Internet publications and other online activities.
The General Administration of Press and Publication is responsible
for licensing all printed or electronic news publication entities and for
screening all publication content. 32 The State Administration of
Radio, Film, and Television plays a similar role for the mediums of
radio, television, satellite, and Internet broadcasts.3 3 The Ministry for
Information Industry regulates telecommunications and software,
including the power of licensing and registration of all Internet
information services.34 The State Council Information Office also
regulates the content of Internet news publications, its goal being to
"promote Chinese media to publicize China to the world, including
China's policies, stands, economic development, history and
culture." 35 The Central Propaganda Department is CPC's propaganda
wing and is responsible for ensuring that all publication and broadcast
content is consistent with the Communist Party's ideology.3 6 The
actual filtering and monitoring of the Internet is accomplished by the
Ministry of Public Security. 37 Lastly, the State Secrecy Bureau
enforces China's ambiguous state secrets laws and prosecutes Chinese
- * 38citizens that disseminate state secrets without permission.
These agencies enforce China's laws and promulgate their own
regulations to deal with Internet content. The agencies control both
who is able to post content on the Internet (via licensing and
application requirements) and what content is posted. One of the most
powerful prior restraints on free speech is the licensing or registration
31. Id at art. 40.
32. Congressional - Executive Commission on China, Agencies Responsible for
Censorship in China, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcadlexp/expcensors.php (last visited
Feb. 5, 2011).
33. Id.
34. Id
35. Id.
36. Id
37. Id.
38. CECC, Prior Restraints, supra note 9.
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scheme. By pre-approving who gets to speak and who does not,
governments can engage in content or viewpoint speech
discrimination. In China, anyone who provides information to the
public through the Internet, publishes works online, posts news
articles, distributes audio-visual materials, or operates an Internet
bulletin board, message forum, or chat room must first receive a
permit from the appropriate government agency.39 Furthermore, any
content that someone wants to publish is required to be pre-approved
by the government or acquired from government-authorized
sources.4 0
In addition to pre-approval procedures, the Chinese government
can also require domestic Internet content providers to monitor and
remove content and can block content from providers that it cannot
directly regulate. Under domestic regulations, Internet services that
host publications or bulletin boards must retain records for
information posted to their sites, when posted, and the IP address or
city name of the posting source for a sixty day period.4 1 The
government places the burden on Internet information services to
monitor the content of posts, to delete illegal information, and to
maintain records of their monitoring efforts and submit them to state
42
authorities. Internet access providers and Internet cafes must
maintain records of a customer's identification or account number, IP
address, personal information, personal photograph, and online
activity for a sixty day period.43 These records must be made
available to the police, who use them for monitoring purposes.44
There are estimated to be over 30,000 Internet police that monitor the
content of online traffic and websites for offensive or illegal
content.45 Local officials also use police and hired commentators to
pose as ordinary citizens and flood Internet chat rooms and blogs with
pro-govemment comments.46 The government has even created pop-
up cartoon characters, police officers Jing and Cha, which appear on
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Congressional - Executive Commission on China, Blocking, Filtering, and
Monitoring, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcadlexp/expjamming.pbp (last visited Feb. 5,
2011).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. John Markoff, Surveillance ofSkype Messages Found in China, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/02/technology/intemet/02skype.html.
46. Michael Wines et al., China's Censors Tackle and Trip Over the Internet, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/worldlasia/08censor.html.
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websites and warn viewers to avoid unapproved websites and to not
participate in unapproved conversations.4 7
The national security and state secrets laws in China also chill
free speech. Information classified as pertaining to state secrets or
national security cannot be disclosed without prior government
approval.4 8 However, the laws that classify what information falls
under those categories are so vague as to encompass potentially
anything.49 For example, Article 14 of the Regulations on the
Protection of Secrets in News Publishing states that anyone who
wants to provide a foreign news service with a report or publication
that relates to "the nation's government, economy, diplomacy,
technology or military" must first receive approval from the
appropriate state personnel.o This restriction is so open-ended that it
ultimately acts as a ban on communication with foreign press. The
Chinese courts are usually no help to those prosecuted for breaking
the national-security or state-secrets laws. Chinese courts receive
funding from local governments and are accountable to both local and
national government authorities, compromising their independence."
The courts tend to simply restate the law without detailing how the
defendant violated the law, do not engage in Constitutional
interpretation, defer to the state, and do not inquire as to whether the
defendant is actually a threat to national security. 52 In many cases,
like those against human rights activists Shi Tao and Huang Qi,
Chinese courts simply assess guilt based on whether a publication's
contents are an affront to the CPC's political ideology. Taken
47. Richard Spencer, Beifing Police Pop Up to Warn Internet Users, U.K. TELEGRAPH,
Aug. 30, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1 561740/Beijing-police-pop-up-to-
wam-intemet-users.html.
48. Congressional - Executive Commission on China, Silencing Critics by Exploiting
National Security and State Secrets Laws,
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/exp/expsecurity.php (last visited Feb. 5, 2011)
[hereinafter CECC, State Secrets].
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 298-316
(2002); see also Clive Ansley, The Chinese "Judicial System": A Fairy Tale of Beiing, 112
THE VERDICT 58 (2007), available at
http://www.organharvestinvestigation.net/events/verdict112 mar07.pdf.
52. CECC, State Secrets, supra note 48.
53. Id. (Huang Qi was arrested and jailed twice for violating national security and state
secrets laws. In the first case, the evidence presented against him included printed materials and
electronic postings on his website that were pro-democracy or critical of the CPC. The court
simply accepted that evidence without explaining why or how Huang Qi was a national security
threat.); See Criminal Verdict of Shi Tao, Changsha Intermediate People's Court of Hunan
Province, Case No. 19-10 (2005), translated in http://www.globalvoicesonline.org/wp-
1832011]
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together, China's agencies, statutes, regulations, and courts provide a
nebulous system designed to ensure that only government-approved
content gets published.
2.2.2 Technological Methods
To support its laws, China has implemented a sophisticated
technological backbone to control the Internet. In contrast to most
other countries, most Internet service providers (ISPs) in China can
only access the global web through one of four state-controlled
corporations.54 This bottleneck provides the opportunity for the
government to monitor all incoming and outgoing Internet traffic. US
companies such as Sun Microsystems and Cisco Systems have
contracted with the Chinese government to provide them with the
technology used to build the Great Firewall.5 s The simplest
censorship strategy is IP address blocking. Any websites that the
government does not want Chinese users to access are placed on a
constantly evolving blacklist and are blocked. A more advanced
method is domain name resolution hijacking wherein the government
intercepts the request to view a certain website and redirects the user
somewhere else. 57 The government also intercepts information
packets (or transmission control protocol segments) sent through
electronic communications and scans the packets for certain
keywords. 8 If the communication is flagged due to content, it can be
cut off. Lastly, the Chinese government has long been suspected of
engaging in sophisticated hacking and cyber-espionage activities.59
One recent attempt by the Chinese government to expand its
monitoring system was the "Green Dam Youth Escort" software. The
government-controlled web filtering software was intended to block
content/ShiTaoverdict.pdf (In the case of Shi Tao, the court assumed that the contents of the
"top secret" government document he passed to a foreign journalist was a state secret without
mentioning or analyzing the contents of the document).
54. Deibert, supra note 23, at 147.
55. Id. at 148.
56. GLOBAL INTERNET FREEDOM CONSORTIUM, DEFEAT INTERNET CENSORSHIP:
OVERVIEW OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES AND PRODUCTS (2007), available at
http://www.internetfreedom.org/archiveDefeatInternet CensorshipWhitePaper.pdf
[hereinafter GIFC].
57. Id.
58. Id
59. See BRYAN KREKEL, CAPABILITY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO
CONDUCT CYBER WARFARE AND COMPUTER NETWORK EXPLOITATION (Northrup Grumman
Report, Oct. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/NorthropGrummanPRCCyberPaperFINALApp
roved%20Reportl6Oct2009.pdf.
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or filter pornographic content so that children could not access it,
according to government spokesmen.6 0 Originally it was required to
be installed on all computers sold in China, whether made
domestically or in a foreign country. 6 1 The software was instantly
criticized by Chinese Internet surfers, the US government, and human
rights groups because it could be used to censor political and other
sensitive topics. 6 2 The Green Dam software contained three times as
many politically sensitive keywords as pornographic keywords, which
supports the accusations.63 Businesses and trade groups also came out
against the software, citing censorship concerns and the short
timeframe in which the government required the software installation
to be implemented.64 The government, responding to the criticisms,
delayed the release of the software and then eventually made
installation optional for personal computers.6 5 The software was still
required to be installed in schools and Internet cafes.66
2.2.3 Social and Psychological Methods
The Chinese government's complex system of legal and
technological controls for the Internet also has a psychological impact
on those living under the system. China's laws regarding freedom of
expression are vague and ambiguous, leaving much to the discretion
and interpretation of Chinese authorities.67 Since it is difficult to
determine exactly what type of speech crosses the line, people tend to
over-censor themselves to stay on the safe side.6 8 This tendency to
self-censor is reinforced by the high-profile arrests of public figures
such as journalists.69 In fact, a majority of Chinese people are
comfortable with some form of Internet control by the government in
certain areas. A survey conducted in 2007 by the Chinese Academy of
Social Services (CASS) shows that over 80% of respondents thought
60. Jaime FlorCruz & A. Diaz, China Delays Green Dam Internet Filter, CNN.coM, July
1, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/07/01/china.filtering.softwareindex.html.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Lance Whitney, WSJ: China Not Requiring Green Dam Software, CNET NEWS, Aug.
13, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009 3-10308955-83.html.
66. Id.
67. CECC, Prior Restraints, supra note 9.
68. Id.
69. Id.; See also Grace Thompson, An Analysis of Censorship of the Internet in China 9
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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that the Internet should be managed or controlled.70 On the question
of who should play the most important role in Internet control, most
respondents indicated the government, with Internet companies and
parents as the next most important.71 Regarding what subject matter
should be controlled, about 85% of respondents identified
pornography and violence.72 A sizable minority of respondents also
stated that politics (about 45%) and online chatting (about 30%)
should be controlled.7 3 Interestingly, the percentage of respondents
who think that political content and online chatting should be
controlled has gone dramatically up since a previous survey done in
2005.74 The survey also asked about the impact of the Internet on
politics. Most respondents (75.1%) agreed that the Internet helps
people understand politics, and the majority of people (59%) thought
that the Internet would help public officials respect and care about
people's input. Only 47.9% of respondents, however, believed that
people would have "more say about what the government does," and
only 30.3% believed that the Internet gives people "more political
power." 76 This expectation that the Internet will strengthen the
political power of regular citizens has decreased over time, from
62.7% in 2003.n Although these survey results cannot be considered
completely representative of Chinese citizens, they show that Chinese
attitudes about the Internet and government control are not the same
as Western attitudes.
The trend of self-censorship extends beyond individuals and
encompasses companies as well. The Internet Society of China (ISC)
is a quasi-government organization created to "promote healthy
development of [the] Internet in China" by self-regulating, creating
good reputations for companies, protecting the legal benefits of its
70. Guo LIANG, CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SERVICES, SURVEYING INTERNET USAGE
AND ITS IMPACT IN SEVEN CHINESE CITIES 12 (2007), available at
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/16013.pdf [hereinafter CASS]. The
survey was conducted by telephone interviewing of Internet users and non-users in seven
Chinese cities. Id. at 5-7. CASS receives some administrative support from the former China
State Information Office. Id. at 3. How these aspects of the survey may influence the
respondents' answers is unknown.
71. Id. at 15.
72. Id. at 13.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 14 (The percentage of respondents who think political content should be
controlled rose from 7.6% in 2005 to 41.3% in 2007. The percentage of respondents who think
online chatting should be controlled rose from 8.2% to 28.2%).
75. Id. at 86.
76. LIANG, supra note 70, at 86.
77. Id. at 87.
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members, and playing a role in policy and regulation creation.7 8
Although membership in the ISC is voluntary, the organization's
connection to the Chinese government (via the Ministry of
Information Industry) places considerable pressure, for Internet
companies to join. 79 The ISC has many large Chinese companies as
members, including search engines (e.g., Baidu, Sohu), media outlets
(e.g., People's Daily, Xinhua, and CCTV), and telecommunications
companies (e.g., China Telecom, China Mobile).80 The membership
list also includes several foreign companies such as Cisco Systems,
Microsoft, Yahoo! (via its majority ownership of Alibaba), and
Siemens.81 Companies that join the ISC must agree to the
organization's public pledge, which includes the promise to refrain
from "producing, posting or disseminating pernicious information that
may jeopardize state security and disrupt social stability, contravene
laws and regulations and spread superstition and obscenity." 2 The
pledge also states that members should monitor information
publicized by users and remove harmful information promptly. 8 3
Yahoo! and Microsoft were criticized by human rights groups for
signing the pledge and censoring their services.84
3.0 LEGAL RIGHTS OF INTERNET USERS
The myriad of tactics that China uses to monitor the Internet has
garnered much criticism from human rights groups and democratic
countries throughout the world" In this next section, the international
78. Internet Society of China, Internet Society of China,
http://www.isc.org.cn/isc-elntroduction/index.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
79. See Nellie L. Viner, The Global Online Freedom Act: Can US. Internet Companies
Scale the Great Chinese Firewall at the Gates of the Chinese Century?, 93 IOWA L. REv. 361,
374-75 (2007).
80. Internet Society of China, ISC Members, http://www.isc.org.cn/isc e/member.php
(last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
81. Id
82. Internet Society of China, Public Pledge of Self-Regulation and Professional Ethics
for China Internet Industry, http://www.isc.org.cn/20020417/cal02762.htm (last visited Feb. 5,
2011) [hereinafter Public Pledge].
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Amnesty International USA, Censorship in China,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/business-and-human-rights/intemet-censorship/implicated-
companies/page.do?id= 1101584 (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
85. See, e.g., Human Rights in China, "China's Internet": Staking Digital Ground, CRF
2010, NO. 2, http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/category?cid=1 7 5 03 3 (last visited Feb. 5,
2011); Peter Ford, Clinton Bluntly Condemns China on Internet Censorship, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 21, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-
Pacific/2010/0121/Clinton-bluntly-condemns-China-on-Internet-censorship.
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law and US domestic law regarding free speech and privacy online
will be discussed.
3.1 International Law and the Internet
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted
in 1948 by the newly formed UN General Assembly, provides the
basis for most international human rights norms. Article 12 of the
UDHR outlines the right of privacy, stating that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence... ."86 The right of free speech is found in Article
19, which states that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion
and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers."8  The drafters of the
UDHR predicted the advent of new forms of communication and
wished to protect them as well.
Protection for the rights of free speech and privacy are repeated
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a
covenant adopted by the UN General Assembly on Dec. 16, 1966,
which came into force Mar. 23, 1976. Article 17 of the ICCPR
protects the right of privacy, and has almost the same wording as
Article 12 of the UDHR. 8 9 Article 19 of the ICCPR protects free
speech, stating that everyone "shall have the right to hold opinions
without interference."90 It expands on this right, providing that the
right to free expression includes the "freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice." 91 The ICCPR includes an exception to the
right of free expression in Article 19(3), stating that the exercise of
the right carries special duties and responsibilities and may be subject
to certain legal restrictions that are necessary to protect the rights or
reputations of others, or to protect national security, public order,
morals, or public health.92 China has signed but has not ratified the
86. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 58, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., Ist plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
87. Id. at art. 19.
88. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, 21
U.N. Doc. A/6316 at 49 (Dec. 16, 1966).
89. Id at art. 17.
90. Id at art. 19.
91. Id
92. Id.; see also Nolan, supra note I1, at 9 (stating that international law and
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ICCPR, which means it is not yet bound by the terms but should be
making an effort to ratify it.93 In its 2009-10 Human Rights Action
Plan, China offered some general promises to improve freedom of
expression and Internet freedom, but only in accordance with
domestic law. 9 4
China has signed and ratified the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).95 The rights of free
speech and privacy are not explicitly protected by the ICESCR.
Deprival of either of these rights, however, can be detrimental to
some rights that are included in the ICESCR, like the right to join
trade unions (Article 8), the right to education (Article 13), the right
to take part of cultural life (Article 15.1(a)), and the right to enjoy the
benefits of scientific progress and its applications (Article 15.1(b)).9 6
These three international instruments form the foundational legal base
for enforcing free speech and privacy rights throughout the world.
The UN covenants were created decades before the Internet
became a common communications medium, yet the same underlying
principles carry over into the online world. Governments should not
be able to interfere with online communications any more than they
can radio and television broadcasts, written documents, or live
speeches. In 2005, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion
and Expression, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, and the Organization of American States issued a joint
declaration concerning rights and freedoms on the Internet. 9 They
clearly recognized that international law regarding freedom of
jurisprudence has established a three-part test for this exception: it must be provided by law, be
required to safeguard one of the legitimate interests in Article 19(3), and be necessary to achieve
the goal).
93. United Nations Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: Status, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno-IV-
4&chapter=4&lang-en (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
94. INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION PLAN OF CHINA (2009-2010) (April 13, 2009), available at
http://www.china.org.cn/archive/2009-04/13/content 17595407.htm.
95. United Nations Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Declarations and Reservations,
http://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?chapter-4&lang-en&mtdsgno=IV-
3&src=TREATY (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
96. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 at 49 (Dec. 16, 1966).
97. UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF OPINION AND EXPRESSION ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS FOR PROMOTING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (Dec. 21, 2005),
available at https://www.cidh.oas.org/relatoria/showarticle.asp?artlD=650&IID=l (joint
declaration between the UN Rapporteur, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media,
and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression).
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expression applies to the Internet and that any government restriction
of the Internet must strictly conform to international freedoms and
guarantees. 98 One of the declarations made is that persons desiring to
operate an ISP, website, blog, or other information service should not
be required to register or obtain permission from a public body.99
Also, any regulation of the Internet should be done by bodies "which
are protected against government, political and commercial
influence . . . ."'0o The declaration considered access to the Internet a
right and placed an obligation on states to provide adequate resources
for universal access. o The declaration makes clear that any
government or commercial filtering that is not end-user controlled is a
form of prior restraint and cannot be justified. 102 Liability for Internet
content cannot be imposed if the person did not author or adopt the
content, unless they refused to obey a court order to remove the
content.103 Lastly, the declaration urges corporations to respect the
online rights of their clients even when dealing with restrictive states,
encouraging corporations to "work together, with the support of other
stakeholders, to resist official attempts to control or restrict use of the
Internet ... 104
3.2 Regulation ofFree Speech and the Internet in the US and
Europe
Western democracies generally follow international law
regarding free speech and privacy but there can still be significant
differences between jurisdictions. Europeans are particularly sensitive
about hate speech and exclude it from free speech protections.105 For
example, in France the hate speech laws go as far as prohibiting the
sale or exhibition of Nazi paraphernalia. 106 In Germany, it is unlawful
for ISPs to host pornographic, violent, or neo-Nazi content.10 7 In a
recent Italian case, four Google executives were convicted of
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. International Mechanisms, supra note 97 (this does not prohibit governments from
shutting down websites with content that is not protected by free speech rights. It only prevents
governments from blanket filtering of content without user consent.).
103. Id
104. Id.
105. Amy 0. Nyberg, Is All Speech Local? Balancing Conflicting Free Speech Principles
on the Internet, 92 GEO. L.J. 663, 665 (2004).
106. Id. at 665-66.
107. Id. at 667.
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violation of privacy for its delay in deleting a user-posted video of an
autistic boy being bullied. o8 For Western European states, the
benefits of unfettered speech do not outweigh the possibility of
racism, xenophobia, and incitement to violence that can result from
unrestricted speech.109 Contrast this with the US position on free
speech, which does protect hate speech, as long as it does not rise to
the level of obscenity, imminent incitement of violence, "fighting
words," or defamation.110 Banning hate speech that does not fall
under an exception would be tantamount to viewpoint discrimination
and would violate the U.S. Constitution."' Thus US law protects a
large swath of hateful speech that would be punished if uttered in
Europe.
The US, through the Bill of Rights, has very expansive legal
protections for freedom of expression. The US relies mainly on self-
regulation by the publisher or content provider, coupled with
legislative regulation on some specific topics. 112 The Communication
Decency Act (CDA) of 1996 gave ISPs a safe harbor from civil
liability for any online content that the ISP only stored or
disseminated, even if the ISP was aware of the content or if it had
paid for the content.' 13 In addition, a Good Samaritan rule was
enacted which shielded ISPs from liability if they voluntarily monitor
data for illegal or harmful content. 1 14 Although ISPs are largely
responsible for content regulation, government regulation trumps self-
regulation in a few instances. ISPs have the affirmative duties of
notifying government authorities and removing content if it involves
child pornography, terrorism, and protection of copyrighted
materials.115
Aside from treaties and participation in international
organizations, there are few US domestic tools available for
extraterritorial regulation of the Internet. One law that has attempted
extraterritorial regulation is the Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA),
108. Rachel Donadio, Larger Threat Is Seen in Google Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/25/technology/companies/25google.html.
109. See Nyberg, supra note 105, at 665.
110. Id. at 673.
111. Christopher D. Van Blarcum, Internet Hate Speech: The European Framework and
the Emerging American Haven, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781, 816 (2005).
112. See B. Frydman et al., Public Strategies for Internet Co-Regulation in the United
States (Oct. 12, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1282826.
113. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1996).
114. Id.
115. Frydman, supra note 112, at 4.
1912011]
192 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 27
which provides a private cause of action to aliens for torts committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the US. 1 16 Recently the
Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the ATCA to cover only acts
which violate specific, universal, and obligatory standards in
customary international law. '" That did not stop plaintiffs from suing
under the ATCA for Internet-related torts. Wang Ziaoning, a Chinese
dissident, was convicted by the Chinese authorities of subversion after
Yahoo! gave the authorities Wang's account information." 8 Wang's
wife sued Yahoo! under the ATCA and the Torture Victim Protection
Act, alleging that Yahoo!'s actions led to violations of US-signed
treaties, Congressional statutes, international and domestic court
decisions, and specific, universal, and obligatory standards of
customary international law." 9 Under pressure by Congress, Yahoo!
settled the lawsuit. 20 Since the merits of the claims were never
reached, it is unknown how a court would have ruled on Yahoo!'s
liability under the ATCA.121
3.3 US Internet Companies Entangled in China
Since the Internet is regulated differently in different countries,
difficulties arise when US Internet companies start to do business
abroad. In the case of China, companies that want to provide Internet
services in that country must subject themselves to the laws and
regulations of the Chinese authorities. Many of these regulations are
contrary to the US's more liberal approach to Internet regulation and,
to a lesser extent, that of Western Europe.122 So these Internet
116. 28U.S.C.§ 1350(1948).
117. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (stating that an example of a
specific, universal, and obligatory standard is piracy).
118. Wang Xiaoning et al. v. Yahoo! Inc. et al., No. C07-02151 CW (N.D. Cal., July 30,
2007) (second amended complaint), available at
http://www.humanrightsusa.org/index2.php?option=com docman&task=doc view&gid=68&Ite
mid=80.
119. Id. at 3.
120. Elinor Mills, Yahoo Settles Lawsuit with Jailed Chinese Journalists, CNET NEWS,
Nov. 13, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784 3-9815950-7.html.
121. For a discussion of the merits of the claims, see Mara D. Bryne, When in Rome:
Aiding and Abetting in Wang Xiaoning v. Yahoo, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 151 (2008); DeNae
Thomas, Xiaoning v. Yahoo Inc's Invocation of the Alien Tort Statute: An Important Issue but
an Improper Vehicle, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 211 (2008); Brian R. Israel, "Make Money
Without Doing Evil?" Caught Between Authoritarian Regulations in Emerging Markets and a
Global Law of Human Rights, U.S. ICTs Face a Twofold Quandary, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
617, 628-36 (2009).
122. See Paul Przybylski, A Common Tool for Individual Solutions: Why Countries Should
Establish an International Organization to Regulate Internet Content, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 927, 934-40 (2007).
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companies are caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place of
trying to appease the Chinese government on one side and Western
governments and human rights groups on the other side.
The quintessential examples of companies caught in this vise are
the US software giants Google, Microsoft, Yahoo! and, on the
hardware side, Cisco Systems. Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! All
censor the results of their Chinese-language search engines to
different degrees by removing politically sensitive content from the
search results. 123 In addition, Microsoft has been accused of censoring
content on the blog service it provides.124 Yahoo! was widely
criticized for giving the Chinese government the e-mail account
information of Shi Tao, a Chinese journalist.125 Shi Tao was then
arrested and jailed for violating state secrets law, all for passing along
information from the Central Propaganda Department regarding
reporting on the anniversary of Tiananmen Square. 126 Cisco Systems
has been accused of supplying the Chinese government with
hardware, some of which has been used to build the Great Firewall.127
These four companies have been criticized by human rights groups
for bowing to Chinese government pressure to censor and, in 2006,
executives from these companies faced interrogation from a US
Congressional Subcommittee on their actions.12 8 In their defense, the
companies asserted that they must comply with local laws wherever
they operate, that access to censored information is better than no
access at all, that their presence will aid economic development
followed by political change, and that censorship occurs regardless of
whether they are involved.129
The US Congress responded to these violations of free speech
and privacy by proposing the Global Online Freedom Act (GOFA) of
2006, a bill designed to regulate the behavior of US Internet
companies extraterritorially. This bill never passed into law, probably
because it touched upon sensitive matters of foreign policy. Section
123. See generally NART VILLENEUVE, SEARCH MONITOR PROJECT: TOWARD A MEASURE
OF TRANSPARENCY (2008), available at http://www.nartv.org/mirror/searchmonitor.pdf (Citizen
Lab Occasional Paper #1).
124. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNDERMINING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN CHINA 20
(2006), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL30/026/2006/en/Icelac2d-
d4lb-1 Idd-8743-d305bea2b2c7/pol300262006en.pdf [hereinafter Amnesty FOE).
125. Id. at 18.
126. Nolan, supra note 11, at 7.
127. Anne Broache, Senators weigh new laws over China online censorship, CNET NEWS,
May 20, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9948331-7.html.
128. Nolan, supra note 1231, at 1.
129. Amnesty FOE, supra note 124, at 23-26.
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201 of the proposed GOFA required that any US Internet company
operating in a designated "Internet-restricting country" may not locate
any of their data hardware in that country. 130 GOFA would have
forbidden companies from filtering search engine results and required
companies to disclose to the US government requests by foreign
governments to filter information.13 1 In addition, GOFA prevented
companies from filtering US-based or US-supported content and
required them to provide the US government with a copy of all
content that foreign countries request to be removed from the
Internet. 132 Lastly, GOFA provided for hefty civil and criminal
penalties for violations of the Act. 133 The four companies at the heart
of the controversy preferred that no legislation be passed and some
human rights groups agreed, expressing their preference for a
voluntary code of conduct. 134 There were also concerns that GOFA
could be politically abused, potentially turning US companies into
spies against foreign governments, and acting as a culturally
imperialistic piece of legislation that the US would try to impose on
the world.13 1
On Jan. 12, 2010, in the latest tussle between China and Western
Internet companies, Google publicly announced that it would stop
cooperating with Chinese Internet censors and consider removing its
entire operation from China. 136 Google alleged that it, along with
some other Western technology companies, was the victim of a
sophisticated cyber-attack on its computer systems.13 7 This cyber-
attack apparently included intrusions into the Gmail accounts of
several human rights activists involved with China.13 8 Although there
130. GOFA, supra note 15.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Surya Deva, Corporate Complicity in Internet Censorship in China: Who Cares for
the Global Compact or the Global Online Freedom Act?, 39 GEOWASH. INT'L L. REv. 255,
314 (2007) [hereinafter Deva, Complicity].
135. See id. at 315-17; see generally Lindsay Eastwood, "Don't Be Evil": Google Faces
the Chinese Internet Market and the Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. &
TECH. 287 (2008); Jennifer Shyu, Comment, Speak No Evil: Circumventing Chinese
Censorship, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 231-32 (2008).
136. Andrew Jacobs et al., Google, Citing Attack, Threatens to Exit China, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/13/world/asia/13beijing.html.
137. Id.
138. Edward Wong, Hackers Said to Breach Gmail Accounts in China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/technology/companies/19google.html (in some
accounts, the settings were changed so that all messages would be forwarded to unfamiliar
addresses).
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is no conclusive evidence that the Chinese government is behind the
attack, experts have examined the malware and strongly suspect it is
of Chinese origin. 3 9 Sergey Brin, one of Google's founders and a
Russian refugee, had always been unsettled by Google's move into
China in 2006, and ultimately the cyber-attacks pushed the rest of
Google's executives to his side. 140 The US government soon entered
the debate, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivering a
pointed speech defending Internet freedom, going so far as to name
China and stating: "Countries or individuals that engage in cyber-
attacks should face consequences and international condemnation."l41
China fired back, accusing the US of turning a commercial dispute
into political grandstanding and urging the US to "stop using the so-
called Internet freedom question to level baseless accusations." 42
Other technology companies were not very supportive of Google's
position. Yahoo!, also a victim of the cyber-attacks, publicly
supported Google's decision, only to be criticized by its Chinese
partner, Alibaba, for making reckless statements.14 3 Bill Gates, whose
company Microsoft was not a victim, stated that China's "efforts to
censor the Internet have been very limited" and regarded Google's
actions as overblown. 144 Gates reiterated that companies in China
must obey Chinese law.145 After over two months of fruitless
negotiations, Google decided to shut down Google.cn and redirect
users to its Hong Kong search engine.146 Although Google hopes to
retain its other business units in China, it is uncertain whether the
Chinese government and Chinese companies will shun Google based
on this move. 4 1
139. John Markoff, Evidence Found for Chinese Attack on Google, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.20,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/technology/20cyber.html.
140. See Jessica E. Vascellaro, A Heated Debate at the Top, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704675104575001281662251848.html.
141. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks on Internet
Freedom at the Newseum (Jan. 23, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.
142. Mark Landler & Edward Wong, China Rebuffs Clinton on Internet Warning, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/23/world/asia/23china.html.
143. Adam Hartley, Yahoo stayed quiet about Chinese cyber-attacks, TECHRADAR.COM,
Jan. 16, 2010, http://www.techradar.com/news/internet/yahoo-stayed-quiet-about-chinese-cyber-
attacks-664102.
144. Sky Canaves, China Ratchets Up Web Privacy Fight, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703410004575028931978304078.html.
145. Id.
146. Miguel Helft & Michael Wines, Google Faces Fallout as China Reacts to Site Shift,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/technology/24google.html.
147. Id.
2011] 195
196 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 27
The Senate Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law was
also involved in these issues, holding a hearing about Internet
freedom on March 2, 2010.148 Over thirty technology companies were
invited to speak including Facebook, Twitter, Hewlett-Packard, and
Apple, but only Google attended. 14 9 The hearing dealt with Google's
decision to withdraw their search engine from China and efforts by
the executive branch to aid Internet freedom, as well as the Global
Network Initiative (GNI), a corporate code of conduct that governs
Internet freedom.150 The senators in attendance expressed frustration
that more companies were not taking the problem of Internet
restriction seriously.'s Although they said that the GNI held much
promise, the senators were concerned that it did not have many
participants. 152 Representatives from the State and Commerce
Departments outlined how the executive administration was dealing
with these issues, from funding anti-censorship technologies to
considering export controls on certain technologies capable of
censorship.' Google's general counsel acknowledged that they were
in a tight bind in China but reiterated that they were doing the best
they could under the circumstances and that they believed the GNI
could still be an effective tool to promote Internet freedom.15 4
4.0 A Two-PRONGED APPROACH FOR US INTERNET COMPANIES IN
CHINA
Simple domestic legislation will probably not solve the
conundrum that US Internet companies face in China. GOFA would
have forced companies like Google to either violate the law or exit
China altogether. This all-or-nothing approach to promoting Internet
freedom is unlikely to work and will result in less products and
services being offered to the Chinese public. China is a huge market,
and saddling US companies with restrictive legislation will diminish
their competitiveness with foreign companies. Rather than applying a
top-down approach that clamps down on Internet companies, China
148. Global Internet Freedom and the Rule of Law, Part II: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Human Rights and the Law of the S. Judiciary Comm., 11Ith Cong. (2010), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4437 [hereinafter Senate Hearing].
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Senate Hearing, supra note 148.
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should consider utilizing a bottom-up approach that relies on the
voluntary efforts of companies and civil society, which is more likely
to succeed. A two-prong approach, with one prong relying on the soft
law of a corporate code of conduct and the other prong relying on
market forces, may be more effective at freeing the Internet in China.
4.1 The Legal Prong-An International Corporate Code of
Conduct
Corporations were traditionally viewed as money-making
enterprises with a sole duty to increase value to the shareholders of
the company. Corporate social responsibility began to take root at the
beginning of the twentieth century,."ss As the size of corporations
increased, so did their power. The government tried to control this
power through antitrust law.'5 6 Wealthy businessmen began to believe
that they were responsible for those less fortunate and also for society
in general, not just their shareholders. 5 7 This philosophy slowly
developed throughout the twentieth century, aided by non-
governmental organization (NGO) watchdogs that monitored the
activities of corporations.
One of the results of the corporate social responsibility
movement was the development of the corporate code of conduct
(CCC). A CCC is a voluntary code that can be set up by an individual
company, a group of companies, or a mixture of companies, NGOs,
and government bodies.158 The goal of CCCs is to dictate desired
behavior in certain business situations, ranging from internal matters
like management, human resources, and whistle-blowing to external
matters like environmental impact, consumer protection, and human
rights. A CCC is not legally binding but rather acts as a set of
guidelines to which companies aspire. The codes may also include
monitoring or enforcement procedures to ensure that participants
adhere to the standards of the code. The benefits of having a code of
conduct include fostering a positive public image and preventing
negative publicity or liability, and also to set a level playing field for
CCCs that span an entire industry.159
Codes for TNCs are especially useful for harmonizing
155. Ans Kolk et al., International codes of conduct and corporate social responsibility:
can transnational corporations regulate themselves?, 8 TRANSNAT'L CORP. J. 143, 148 (1999).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next
Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 392 (2005).
159. Id. at 402.
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worldwide standards. Since the Internet is a global technology, an
effective international CCC that requires the cooperation of
companies worldwide would be most effective in protecting the rights
of Internet users.160 Jurisdictional and political problems will arise if
each state tries to enforce domestic Internet legislation
extraterritorially. For example, the Chinese may see GOFA as an
indirect attack on their policies rather than simply another piece of US
legislation. An international CCC that regulates free speech and
privacy would also influence domestic Chinese companies. Even if all
foreign companies ceased censoring information, domestic Chinese
companies like Baidu would continue to censor because the Chinese
government demands it. If an industry-wide standard is adopted,
however, it would put pressure on Chinese Internet companies to
comply with the standard or risk being shunned by the industry.
Having a CCC also creates more accountability between companies
and users.
One major advantage of a CCC is that it is soft law and therefore
can be modified with relative ease. This is especially important when
dealing with the Internet industry since the technology is still quite
new and always developing in unexpected ways. Legislation is more
cumbersome and cannot adequately keep up with technology. The
flexibility of a CCC can also make it easier for companies to join
because the standards of the CCC can evolve and strengthen over
time from a baseline standard rather than starting as a high initial
hurdle. Despite all the advantages of a CCC, it still may not effect real
change if participants do not take the CCC seriously and there is no
monitoring or enforcement system. The next few sections explore
various international voluntary regulatory codes that have already
been developed as well as their strengths and weaknesses and also
discuss how a CCC relating to the Internet should be structured for
maximum impact.
4.1.1 Business Standards Developed by the UN
In 2000, the UN launched the Global Compact (GC), which is
described as a "voluntary, international learning network that links
companies with" UN agencies and labor and civil organizations.16 1
The goal of the GC is to create an equitable and sustainable economy
160. See D'Jaen, supra note 10, at 347-51.
161. Johanna Brinkmann-Braun & Ingo Pies, The Global Compact's Contribution to
Global Governance Revisited 1-2 (Martin-Luther-Universittit Halle-Wittenberg, Discussion
Paper No. 2007-10, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1001425.
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by establishing a shared set of principles. 162 The GC is not a
regulation or code of conduct but rather a set of ten universal
principles that companies strive to achieve. 163 Of these ten principles,
two are devoted to human rights: (1) businesses "should support and
respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights" and
(2) businesses should "make sure that they are not complicit in human
rights abuses."'6 There are four principles relating to labor standards,
three to the environment, and one to anti-corruption.' 65 Currently over
7,700 corporations from over 130 countries have signed on to the
GC. 166 A company that wants to participate in the GC must
incorporate the GC principles into its strategy and organizational
culture, and must submit an annual report detailing its progress.167
Companies that repeatedly fail to submit reports are considered
inactive and are locked out of the GC framework. 16 8 In addition to
corporations, the GC allows labor organizations, civil society
organizations, and academic institutes to participate in the network. 16 9
The uniqueness of the GC stems from its role as a learning
forum. The GC is supposed to facilitate discourse and education
regarding the ethical responsibilities of business. It does not purport
to regulate business nor does it have any meaningful enforcement
system to ensure that businesses are following the GC principles.
While the promotion of ideal business practices is a noble effort, the
GC suffers from several major problems. First, the lack of
enforcement or monitoring leads to companies signing up for the GC
as a public relations boost without having to institute any real change
within the company. Second, the lack of enforcement also means that
a high number of companies do not submit reports or case studies,
leading to a lack of quality and quantity of information within the
learning network.170 Third, when the GC organizes dialogues,
conferences, or panels, there is often a lack of follow-up and delivery
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. UN Global Compact, The Ten Principles,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html.
165. Id.
166. UN Global Compact, Overview of the UN Global Compact,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/ (Microsoft and Cisco are members, but Yahoo!
and Google are not); Deva, Complicity, supra note 134, at 306.
167. Brinkmann-Braun, supra note 161, at 3.
168. Id. at 8.
169. Id. at 4-5.
170. See id at 8.
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of promised goals as to render much of the effort wasted. '7 Lastly,
GC principles suffer from vagueness, which confuses companies that
try to comply and provides cover for companies that have no intention
of complying.172
In conjunction with the GC, the UN has tried to develop a more
detailed standard for businesses and human rights. The UN Norms on
the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (NRTC) began as
a series of working group meetings by a UN sub-committee to
investigate the interaction between businesses and human rights
standards.17 3 What resulted was a draft set of voluntary norms
covering a wide set of rights including equal opportunity treatment,
non-discrimination, right of security, rights of workers, national
sovereignty, consumer protection, and environmental protection.174
While the NRTC emphasized that states still have primary
responsibility to protect human rights, it placed a lot of affirmative
responsibilities on corporations to improve the social situation of
people they affect.'75 The NRTC referenced or included rights found
in the ICCPR, ICESCR, and many other international treaties and
covenants.176 The NRTC also required businesses to adopt the
standards internally, to incorporate the NRTC into contracts with
other business enterprises, produce progress reports, and be subject to
monitoring by the UN or other international or national organizations,
and provide reparation to those harmed by the failure to comply with
the NRTC. 177 Therefore, despite the fact that the NRTC was intended
as a voluntary international CCC, it resembled compulsory regulation.
In fact, many NGOs had hoped that the NRTC would become
customary international law over time. 178
171. See id.
172. Deva, Complicity, supra note 134, at 295-98.
173. See Larry Cata Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United
Nations' Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of
Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 287, 328-
32 (2006).
174. The Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, 2-14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 13, 2003), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/links/norms-Aug2003.html.
175. Id. at T 1.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 15-18.
178. SARAH ANDERSON, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS 7 (2005), available at
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policylibrary/data/01311/_res/id=saFile1/.
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The NRTC did not garner much attention during its
development, but when it was unveiled in 2004 for public discussion,
business groups and many state governments were not satisfied with
it.179 Businesses highlighted the benefits of voluntary CCCs and
argued that any compulsory regulation would only unduly burden
businesses.80 States were wary because the NRTC effectively
disempowered them from regulating corporations and instead placed
that power on corporations themselves, and on the UN or other
NGOs.'"' The NRTC was also criticized on grounds that one set of
norms would not be adequate to regulate all industries worldwide, the
provisions were too vague, it cannot be properly enforced, and some
of the norms were outside the traditional definition of human
rights. 18 2 In the end, the NRTC was never adopted rendering the
future of the NRTC and other similar proposals unclear.
The discussion of the GC and the NRTC highlights the
difficulties associated with global regulation of businesses with regard
to human rights. These difficulties stem from three main problems:
(1) the allocation of responsibility for the regulation of non-state
actors in international law, (2) the lack of effective means to monitor
and enforce regulations, and (3) the vagueness that comes with trying
to regulate all businesses with a single set of human rights directives.
A voluntary CCC avoids the first problem because it is not a law per
se and thus is free from the constraints of international law doctrine.
The key to an effective CCC lies in how well it handles the second
problem. As for the third problem, perhaps a CCC tailored to specific
industries would be more effective than a broad one. The next section
discusses in detail one such CCC tailored for the information and
communications industry.
4.1.2 The Global Network Initiative
The Global Network Initiative was a result of the grilling that
Microsoft, Yahoo!, and Google received in front of Congress for their
activities in China. They acknowledged that they could do more to
protect user rights, and in October 2008 they jointly unveiled the GNI
179. See David Kinley & Rachel Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for
Corporations: The Private Implications of Public International Law, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 447,
448-449 (2006).
180. Id. at 449.
181. Backer, supra note 173, at 358-60.
182. For example, the consumer protection obligations in the NRTC (e.g. no deceptive
advertising) are not generally considered part of human rights law. Kinley, supra note 179, at
464-78.
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after two years of negotiations. 183 The GNI is a voluntary
international CCC that is intended to be a "systematic approach for
companies, NGOs, investors, academics, and others to work together
in resisting efforts by governments that seek to enlist companies in
acts of censorship and surveillance that violate international
standards." 184 The GNI consists of three components: the core
Principles, the more specific Implementation Guidelines, and the
Governance, Accountability, and Learning Framework. 185
The Principles are based on the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the
ICESCR. 18 6 At the centerpiece of the Principles is the protection of
the rights of free speech and privacy for Internet users. Participants
must respect and protect those rights and avoid or minimize any
government efforts to unduly restrict those rights.1 7 Top officials
within the companies must be informed about decisions that affect
free speech or privacy, and participants must incorporate the
Principles into their decision-making process. 88
The Implementation Guidelines give some more detail about
how to uphold the Principles and provides a way of measuring
compliance. A company's board is specifically given some
responsibilities, from receiving and evaluating regular reports on the
implementation of the Principles to incorporating the protection of
free speech and privacy into their risk management system.189 The
company as a whole must develop a human rights team to oversee the
implementation of the GNI and review government demands, set up a
remediation process to correct business practices inconsistent with the
GNI, provide awareness training for employees, and provide whistle-
blowing mechanisms for employees to report violations. 190 The
Implementation Guidelines also require the creation of human rights
impact assessments when entering new markets, deploying new
183. Ryan Singel, Google Fights China; Will Yahoo and Microsoft Follow?, WIRED.COM,
Jan. 14, 2010, http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/01/yahoo-microsoft-china/.
184. Global Network Initiative Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/faq/index.php (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
185. Id.
186. Global Network Initiative Principles,
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/principles/index.php (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Global Network Initiative Implementation Guidelines for the Principles on Freedom
of Expression and Privacy,
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/implementationguidelines/index.php (last visited Feb. 5,
2011) [hereinafter Implementation Guidelines].
190. Id.
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technologies, dealing with business partners, or responding to
government demands for user data or content restrictions.191
Participants dealing with partners, suppliers, and distributors that can
have a material impact on free speech and privacy must incorporate
the Principles into their business contracts and must use "best efforts"
to make sure those partners respect the Principles. 192
When faced with a government request to censor information or
attain user data, the Implementation Guidelines require participants to
ensure that governments follow established domestic legal processes
(by requesting a clear written communication providing the legal
basis for the request) and narrowly interpret those processes to
minimize any negative impact. 193 When the government demand
seems overbroad, is not required by domestic law, or is inconsistent
with international law, the participants must seek clarification or
modification from officials. 194  If the demand would still be
inconsistent with domestic or international law, participants have the
discretion to challenge the government in domestic courts or seek the
assistance of relevant government authorities, international human
rights bodies, or NGOs. 195 The guidelines also require participants to
clearly disclose to users the domestic laws that are applicable, the
company's procedures for handling government demands, notice and
reason for acts of censorship, and the type of personal information
that is stored and could be disclosed. 19 6 Participants must not enter or
must withdraw from any voluntary agreement to limit the rights of
users in a manner inconsistent with the Principles.'9 7  Lastly,
participants must engage in dialogue with governments, other
companies, NGOs, industry associations, academic institutes, and
other interested organizations with an aim to promote and improve the
GNI.198
191. Id.
192. Id. ("best efforts" are defined as a good faith action to undertake reasonable steps to
achieve the best result in the circumstances and carry the process to its logical conclusion).
193. Id
194. Id.
195. The guidelines add a caveat, stating that "it is neither practical nor desirable for
participating companies to challenge in all cases. Rather, participating companies may select
cases based on a range of criteria such as the potential beneficial impact on freedom of
expression, the likelihood of success, the severity of the case, cost, the representativeness of the
case and whether the case is part of a larger trend." Implementation Guidelines, supra note 189.
196. Id.
197. Id (this provision seemingly targets the Internet Society of China pledge, see Public
Pledge, supra note 82).
198. Id.
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The GNI will be governed by a board of directors with equal
representation from company and non-company participants, and each
participant must help fund the GN.' 99 Some of the responsibilities of
the GNI administration are to produce annual progress reports, recruit
new participants, provide human rights resources, develop an
accountability system, and provide a channel for grievances and
concerns. 20 0 The accountability system is broken into three phases
where the first phase is focused on recruiting participants and then
setting up a reliable independent assessment system. 20 1 According to
the GNI's first Anniversary Newsletter, some of the accomplishments
in its first year include developing a human rights impact assessment
tool, organizing forums and sharing approaches to protecting rights,
responding to current events (such as speaking out against the Green
Dam software), and conducting outreach events to potential
participants.202 After a year and a half, the GNI has finally selected an
executive director and a board of directors.20 3
The GNI is currently two years old and there are only twenty-
20three participants.20 Of those participants, the only Internet
technology companies are Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!, the three
companies that co-founded the GNI. 20 5 The rest of the participants are
a mixture of academic institutes, socially responsible investing
groups, and NGOs.206 Companies like AT&T, McAfee, and Skype
have been in negotiations with the GNI, but none have joined.207
Some of the objections raised by non-member companies are that the
annual fees (ranging from $2,000 to $60,000, depending on annual
revenue) and administrative requirements are too burdensome, the
GNI principles are not relevant to their specific businesses, and they
199. Global Network Initiative, Governance, Accountability & Learning Framework,
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/governanceframework/index.php (last visited Feb. 5,
2011).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Global Network Initiative Anniversary Newsletter,
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/newsletter/index.php (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
203. Global Network Initiative, Global Network Initiative Announces New Executive
Director (Mar. 9, 2010),
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/cms/uploads/l/GNI Executive DirectorAnnouncemen
t_3.09. 10.pdf.
204. Global Network Initiative Participants,
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/participants/index.php (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
205. Id.
206. Id. (the UN Special Representative to the Secretary-General on Business & Human
Rights is listed as an observer).
207. Senate Hearing, supra note 148.
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do not want to be the first movers in their market. 208 The skittishness
of these companies is a major problem for the GNI. While the GNI
must do more to make it easier for potential member companies to
integrate with the network, the onus is ultimately on the potential
member companies to be brave enough to join and make the hard
decisions that the GNI requires.
While some commentators have been optimistic about the
potential of the GNI, others have already pointed out concerns about
its effectiveness. 209 Since the GNI was born out of public criticism of
the founding Internet companies, there is a concern that the GNI's
mandate is only quelling the criticisms and not working on a more
holistic approach.2 10 Indeed, many of the companies invited to speak
at the Senate Subcommittee refused on the grounds that the GNI was
inapplicable to their businesses.211 The two years that it took to create
the GNI indicate that there was substantial disagreement between the
participants, which resulted in some ambiguity in the final
21provisions.212 The GNI provisions were built to give participants a lot
of discretion because each company has a slightly different business
model, but this may allow participants to continually back down from
conflicts. 213 Although Microsoft, Google, and Yahoo! are three of the
most influential Internet companies in the world, the GNI will not
gain much traction if it cannot get any more participants from the
industry, especially companies based outside the US. Lastly, there is a
lack of unity even among the present participants, as seen from the
reactions of Yahoo! and Microsoft to Google's withdrawal from
China. The fact that these three companies are competitors
undermines the effort of GNI participants in supporting each other. If
the current participants cannot present a united front, adding more
members will only fracture the GNI even more.
4.1.3 Making a Successful CCC for Internet Companies in
China
The criticisms of the GNI demonstrate some of the general
weaknesses of CCCs. First, since CCCs are, by definition, voluntary,
a company can simply choose not to participate. The CCC can also be
208. See Id.
209. For a more optimistic view, see Israel, supra note 121, at 651-55.
210. Nolan, supra note 92, at 26.
211. Senate Hearing, supra note 148.
212. Nolan, supra note 92, at 27; see also Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J.
377, 415-17 (2009).
213. Nolan, supra note 92, at 27; Bambauer, supra note 212, at 416-17.
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written in such a vague or ambiguous way as to provide no real
guidance on behavior, thereby leaving it up to the interpretation of
each participant. Such criticisms plagued the GC, NRTC, and GNI. 2 14
Since CCCs are not legally binding, the disciplinary measures for
non-compliance are limited. In a similar manner, monitoring
compliance with the code is difficult unless a robust administrative
system is set up. If the codes are created solely by the entities that the
code is intended to regulate, there is an inherent conflict of interest
that may compromise the integrity and effectiveness of the code. In
contrast, a multi-stakeholder approach that involves NGOs usually
strengthens the terms of the CCC and provides stronger enforcement
mechanisms.215 Voluntary codes may also hinder corporations that
abide by them compared to corporations that do not. Socially
responsible behavior may not correlate positively with profits, and
therefore companies that follow a CCC may be at a competitive
disadvantage against companies that are not socially responsible.216
Building a successful enforcement mechanism for a CCC is very
important to its effectiveness. Without a stick to accompany the
proverbial carrot, the CCC becomes a shield against accusations
rather than an actual tool for improvement. Some scholars argue that
an effective enforcement system can only come from outside of the
corporations being regulated under the code.2 17 For example, NGOs
or international organizations can provide third party monitoring and
enforcement, or even some sort of international business court system
could be created.2 18 Some have proposed that national governments
can aid in overseeing and encouraging the development of CCCs.21 9
Introducing the government into the scheme, however, runs the risk of
politicizing the CCC. The system for monitoring and enforcement that
the GNI envisions involves a group of independent non-government
assessors, thus avoiding the politicization problem.220
Others have suggested that the UN can provide mandatory
214. Deva, Complicity, supra note 134, at 295; Kinley, supra note 179; Nolan, supra note
11, at 27.
215. See Kolk et al., supra note 155, at 174.
216. See Erin Elizabeth Macek, Scratching the Corporate Back: Why Corporations Have
No Incentive to Define Human Rights, 11 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 101, 113-118 (2002).
217. Mahmood Monshipouri et al., Multinational Corporations and the Ethics of Global
Responsibility: Problems and Possibilities, 25 HuM. RTS. Q. 965, 983 (2003).
218. See id. at 985-86.
219. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 158.
220. Global Network Initiative Participants, supra note 204.
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comprehensive regulation. 2 21  Although this would allow for
uniformity and a level playing field, as seen from the discussion of
the GC and the NRTC, it is difficult for one regulatory body to govern
all corporate activity from the top down. The GNI and other CCCs are
different in that they utilize bottom-up regulation being generated by
the companies themselves. The companies are more familiar with the
human rights issues they face on a day to day basis, and a bottom-up
CCC is easier to modify than top-down regulation. This gives
companies the flexibility to adjust to new technologies and changes in
political or social environments around the world. One of the main
weaknesses of the NRTC was that its progress was frozen in debate
among all the various interested parties--corporations, social interest
groups, developed states, developing states. Each had differing
opinions about the composition of the NRTC. Simply by cutting out
states and international organizations from any major role in the
formation of the code, much of the infighting is removed from the
process. While having a voluntary code means that companies can
choose not to participate in the code, the flexibility of a CCC allows
provisions of the code to be negotiated to bring more participants into
the fold.
While CCCs are not international law, some hope that over time
a code can harden into customary international law.222 This may be an
attractive end game for human rights groups that want to promote
CCCs, but difficulties arise in reaching that goal. There are two
traditional requirements for a law or regulation to become customary
international law: state practice and opiniojuris.2 23 Both requirements
focus on state action. States must have a uniform widespread practice
of following the law and consider the law obligatory.224 A CCC acts
on corporations, not states. Even if an entire industry considers a code
obligatory, customary international law would not form unless states
also agreed.225 A significant number of states would have to adopt the
CCC's principles as the rule of law. Also problematic is the persistent
objector doctrine which allows states to become exempt from
customary international laws if they continually object to the law
221. See Macek, supra note 216, at 118-24.
222. See, e.g., Backer, supra note 173, at 367.
223. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between
Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 641 (2000).
224. Id.
225. See Stephan Hobe, The Era of Globalisation as a Challenge to International Law, 40
DUQ. L. REV. 655, 662 (2002). The traditional view of customary international law as focusing
only on state actors has increasingly been questioned. Id.
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while it is still in its formation.226 If China persistently objects to
increased free speech and privacy rights on the Internet, even if all
other states believe such rights have become customary international
law, China will be exempt from it. Despite these difficulties, there are
examples that CCCs have formed into hard law or been incorporated
into customary international law, such as the hardening of
international securities regulations.22 7 Thus while the hardening of
CCCs into hard law is something to be hoped for, it should not be
relied upon as the ultimate goal of CCCs.
The GNI is a promising start in building a robust CCC for the
Internet industry, but there are several concerns that it must address.
First and foremost, the GNI needs more Internet communications
companies as participants. While Microsoft, Yahoo!, and Google
collectively hold dominant market share and any actions they take
would have significant impact, there is a danger that without wider
industry support, the GNI will simply become a tool of those three
giants. To become a truly international CCC, participants must range
from start-ups to established companies, and there must be
participation from non-US companies. Secondly, the GNI must
demonstrate a reliable monitoring system as soon as possible. Their
independent assessment program should evaluate the three founding
companies immediately. The results of the assessments will show if
the GNI can adequately critique the practices of the companies rather
than gloss over any human rights violations that they are engaged in.
The assessments must also provide concrete metrics for improvement.
The guidelines and principles must be expanded on and clarified to
cover more situations like functionality of products and due diligence.
Lastly, the GNI participants must present a united front against China,
or else China will easily manipulate the participants, who are also
business competitors, against each other.
4.2 The Market Prong-Building User Support
The development of a CCC to protect online rights is only half
the battle in protecting free speech and privacy. Companies do not
have all the power when it comes to the Internet. An advantageous
quality about the Internet is that it gives a lot of power to the users-
knowledge, the ability to talk and collaborate, and the ability to
226. Lynn Loschin, The Persistent Objector and Customary Human Rights Law: A
Proposed Analytical Framework, 2 U.C. DAVISJ. INT'LL. &POL'Y 147, 149 (1996).
227. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in
Securities Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 883, 884 (2009); id. at 938-39.
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manipulate the technology for their own uses. The power of Internet
users can be harnessed to push companies and governments not to
interfere with their individual rights. Corporate shaming and
collective consumer choice is also a powerful tool that forces
companies to listen to their costumers and society in general. This
section deals with market-based actions that Internet companies can
make to reinforce and strengthen the effect of a CCC.
4.2.1 Chinese Opinions of the Internet
The use of the Internet in China has risen dramatically since it
was first introduced. Now the Internet and other electronic
communications mediums in general have become an integral part of
life for many Chinese.2 2 8 Chinese users are increasingly using the
Internet as a major source of news and information. 22 9 It is also a
major social-networking tool, with hundreds of millions of people
using instant messaging, social-networking sites, and blogs.230 There
has been a rapid increase in the number of Chinese people shopping,
* * 231trading stock, and engaging in other commercial activities online.
The CASS survey discussed in Section 2.2.3 revealed that many
Chinese users actually preferred that the Internet be managed or
controlled and that the government was the most preferred entity to
implement the regulation.232 Overall the Chinese do not believe much
online content is reliable and most often trust information found on
government websites.233 Chinese users most worry about the impact
of the Internet on children, especially from pornography, Internet
addiction, and the formation of bad friendships.234 Curiously, a
sizable number of Chinese also want online political content to be
controlled.235 One theory to explain why the Chinese prefer tight
control of the Internet is that they are under the constant media
barrage of stories regarding the negative social effects of the
Internet.236 Stories involving online vigilantism, tabloid journalism,
228. See generally CINIC, supra note 6.
229. Id at 38-39.
230. Id. at 40-43.
231. Id. at 45-48.
232. LIANG, supra note 70, at 15.
233. DEBORAH FALLOWS, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, MOST CHINESE
SAY THEY APPROVE OF GOVERNMENT INTERNET CONTROL (2008), available at
http://www.markle.org/sites/default/files/pipchina-internet-2008_0.pdf
234. Id.
235. LIANG, supra note 70, at 13.
236. FALLOWS, supra note 233.
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vicious gossip, and Internet addiction have made people wary, and so
the Chinese seek some sort of control over it.2 37 Given China's
historical and cultural context, the government is the most natural and
trusted source of control. 2 38 At the same time, Internet use is rapidly
growing, especially among the young. This leads to an interesting
clash of values: the desire for state control versus the desire for
increased freedom to explore and express opinions.
It may not make the most sense for foreign governments,
corporations, and human rights groups to argue that the Chinese
government should have little or no control over Internet content.
This argument does not resonate with the majority of Chinese users
and has the taint of cultural imperialism. They clearly see the
government as a sort of safety net that has a role in protecting citizens
from harmful content. 23 9 Most of the content that Chinese users are
wary of involves moral decay e.g. pornography, violence, malicious
gossip, and addiction.240 Social and political issues are seen as less
potentially damaging to society.24 1 In fact, the Internet has been used
by the Chinese to promote social causes and to protest political
242
actions.22 The government is aware of this bifurcation of issues and
tries to sell its censorship projects as targeting moral decay while
underhandedly targeting social and political material as well. This is
exactly what the CPC did with the Green Dam project, alleging that it
was intended to block pornography while in reality the software
243
contained many political filters. Internet companies can use a
similar tactic but for the opposite purpose. They can build trust with
Chinese users by complying with more stringent government
regulations for pornograpy or other material considered morally
damaging. At the same time, they should stand up for users' rights in
cases where the government tries to clamp down on political or social
content. By doing so, companies will censor what Chinese people
want censored but will protect the free speech and privacy rights of
237. See id
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id
241. See id.
242. See, e.g., Jonathan Watts, Chinese Government Critic Calls for One-Day Internet
Protest, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, June 23, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/23/china-
intemet-protest-censorship-ai-weiwei; Malcolm Moore, Chinese internet vigilantes bring down
another official, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK, Dec. 30, 2008,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/4026624/Chinese-intemet-vigilantes-
bring-down-another-official.html.
243. FlorCruz, supra note 60.
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users on issues in which they do not want government control.
Although ideally the rights of free speech and privacy should be
protected regardless of the content of the information, some give and
take in the social context of China may be necessary to gain user
support and placate the government to some extent.
4.2.2 Improved Services and Innovation
Companies always strive to win more customers, build brand
loyalty, and increase market share. The Internet search market is no
different. In the US, Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft account for
approximately 93% of all Internet searches as of October 2009.244
China, however, the US companies are still underdogs. As of
September 2008, Chinese search engine Baidu had a 60.9% market
share while Sogou, another Chinese search engine, held a 3.1%
share. 245 Meanwhile Google held a 27% market share in China, and
Yahoo! held a 2.4% share.246 Other US Internet companies have not
had much luck in China either. eBay misread the Chinese market and
was outmaneuvered in China by Chinese company Taobao, which did
not charge for listings and had a chat function that allowed buyers and
sellers to build up trust before completing transactions.247 MySpace
could not oust deeply enrooted domestic social networking sites like
Tencent that had much more functionality, including instant
messaging software, virtual currency, and games.248 Facebook and
Twitter gained followers in China but kept getting blocked by
Chinese censors, unlike domestic sites which built cozy relationships
with regulators. 2 49 US Internet companies are clearly still having
difficulty penetrating an insular Chinese market.
Interestingly enough, when Chinese users were asked to evaluate
the quality of the Baidu search engine versus Google's engine,
Google was considered superior to Baidu in all categories including
search result relevancy, ranking fairness, safety and security,
244. comScore, comScore Releases October 2009 US. Search Engine Rankings,
COMSCORE.COM Nov. 17, 2009,
http://www.comscore.com/PressEvents/PressReleases/2009/1 1/comScore Releases October_
2009 U.S. Search Engine Rankings.
245. CHINA INTELLICONSULTING CORP., CHINA SEARCH ENGINE SURVEY REPORT 2008
RELEASED (2008), http://www.iaskchina.cn/en/Report/view/id/13 [hereinafter CIC].
246. Id.
247. David Barboza & Brad Stone, China, Where US. Internet Companies Often Fail,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2010, at Bl, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/technology/16failure.html.
248. Id.
249. Id
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technology and innovation, and corporate image.25 0 Yet Baidu still
has the larger market share. This may be due partly to national pride
in supporting domestic companies and also an unwillingness to be
associated with a Western company, and, by implication, Western
philosophy and politics. In fact, Chinese newspapers have alleged an
intimate relationship between Google and the US government that
makes the two seemingly interchangeable.25 1
Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft all censor their Chinese search
results to some extent, but a censorship study shows that Baidu
censors more content than the US companies.2 52 Each search engine,
however, censors different keywords and websites, and there is
surprisingly very little overlap between them. 253 This means that even
though US companies censor content in China, their mere presence
increases the accessibility of information by the Chinese people. US
companies should continue to make a concerted push into the Chinese
market, focusing on the quality of the services they provide and
making sure to cater to Chinese needs.254 If US companies can
increase their market share, it will make it harder for the government
to bully them. Increased market share also leads to more dialogue
with the consumers and more influence within the industry. At the
same time, the US companies need to engage companies like Baidu
and try to bring them into the fold of an Internet CCC like the GNI.
This will be difficult since domestic Chinese companies have fewer
options than foreign companies for getting around Chinese law. A
strong industry standard, however, can put pressure on companies like
Baidu to comply at least incrementally with the standard. Although
China likes all companies within its borders to play by its rules,
people both inside and outside China believe that Google's
withdrawal and Beijing's belligerence threatens the continued
development of China's technology industry.255
Aside from gaining market share and influencing the industry,
companies can aid the protection of user's rights through the
250. See CIC, supra note 245.
251. See Ding Yifan, Google's Exit a Deliberate Plot, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 25, 2010,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-03/25/content_9638825.htm.
252. Villeneuve, supra note 123, at 10-12.
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254. Google's exit from China may have been a principled stand. Unfortunately, it left an
open market segment that on which domestic Chinese companies like Baidu quickly capitalized.
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TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/worldlasia/24china.html.
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provision of more services and the introduction of new technologies
that can improve the methods of communication. When Youtube and
Twitter were introduced into the Chinese market, they were disruptive
technologies that allowed the Chinese to communicate in new and
innovative ways, sending government authorities scrambling to find
ways to control them. For example, when ethnic riots broke out in
Tibet in 2008 and in Xinjiang in 2009, information about the events
was leaked to the rest of the world via Youtube and Twitter before the
256government could block Internet access to those regions. By
providing new ways of communicating, Internet companies make it
harder for any government to censor and lock down information.
Not all the work has to be done by Internet companies. Chinese
users, through the use of specially built hardware or software or even
the use of Internet memes, can tunnel through China's Great Firewall.
Numerous hardware and software workarounds already exist.257
Businesses and other organizations outside China provide censorship
circumvention software, such as California-based AnchorFree. 25 8
Although only a small portion of the Chinese public is tech savvy
enough to find and use these tools, more people will seek increased
freedom and discover these workarounds as Internet usage
expands. 2 59 This game of cat and mouse between the CPC and the
technology community benefits all by pushing the bounds of
innovation and technological freedom. The use of Internet memes is
another way of subverting government control. In early 2009, a
cartoon animal called the Grass-Mud Horse was introduced into
Chinese cyberspace. 2 60 This innocuous-looking children's cartoon
was actually anything but-the Chinese pronunciation of Grass-Mud
Horse sounds very similar to a vulgar expression.2 61 Since the
Chinese characters for Grass-Mud Horse are harmless, the meme
26
went undetected by government censors.262 There are songs and
animated cartoons depicting the Grass-Mud Horse's struggle with the
256. Owen Fletcher & Dan Nystedt, Internet, Twitter Blocked in China City Ar Ethnic
Riot, PCWORLD, July 6, 2009,
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River Crab, symbolic of China's censorship regime because the
pronunciation is similar.26 3 Another meme was spawned from a
simple 12 character message on a Baidu gaming discussion board
telling someone named Jia Junpeng that his mother wanted him to
come home and eat.264 Within one day there were 7,000,000 hits and
300,000 comments to that message ranging from the comical to the
absurd.265 At around the same time, a blogger named Guo Baofeng
was arrested by local police upon accusations that he used his blog to
spread rumors about the police.2 66 Upon hearing of his arrest, another
blogger urged people to send the police station postcards with the
message "Guo Baofeng, your mother wants you to go home to eat" as
a play on the original meme.2 67 Guo Baofeng was soon released,
reasons unspecified. 26 8 There are also more overt ways that Chinese
people have stood up to government officials, using online activism to
expose corruption, abuse, or social injustice.2 69 How all of this will
interact with Chinese politics in the future is still unknown, but
Internet companies would do well to provide means and technology
for the Chinese Internet culture to grow organically.
4.2.3 The Connection Between Economic and Political
Freedom
Within the past several decades, countries like Taiwan, South
Korea, and Chile have experienced a transition from authoritarian
regimes to democratic regimes after a period of economic
270liberalization. Many hoped that the opening of China's economy in
the 1980s would soon lead to political democratization as well. 27 1 Yet,
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while China has experienced a tremendous growth in economic
power, significant political reform has yet to occur. The CPC has
managed to limit the political impact of economic reform, and while
some legal reforms have been made, the progress is in areas
considered politically safe like commercial and administrative law.272
The CPC has managed to streamline their operations and
institutionalize themselves even more than before.273 The CPC tends
to demonize Western democracies, resulting in many Chinese
believing that the US is trying to contain China's rise to power and
destabilize the country.274 A majority of Chinese people are offended
by criticisms of their government's human rights abuses and believe
that foreigners simply do not understand China's culture.2 75
So far, the impact of the Internet on China's political landscape
is uncertain. The initial hope that the spread of the Internet would
quickly lead to political transparency has not come to pass as the CPC
developed legal, technological, and social methods of control over the
Internet.276 China's suppression of "coordination goods," such as
political rights, human rights, press freedom, and accessible higher
education, in combination with economic growth, actually leads to a
strengthening of the regime and a decrease in the likelihood of
democratization.27 7 In part, this is because the economic benefits
placate the Chinese people.278 If people see that their economic power
is increasing and that they can afford newer and better things and
entertain themselves, the importance of political issues fades. They
assume that the current political environment is responsible for their
increased living standards and do not wish to change the status quo.
Also, it may be that many Chinese still have a limited understanding
about the greater political discourse and therefore do not know about
issues that should concern them, a situation the CPC perpetuates
through censorship.279
If political reform is to come, many think that it will come from
the rural areas of China, regions where people have least benefited
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from economic reform. 28 0 The ever-growing gap between the wealthy
and the poor is leading to increased social unrest. The number of
public order disturbances or protests has increased dramatically
within the last decade. 28 1 As the connectivity of the Internet slowly
spreads to rural areas, there will be more information sharing between
the richer coastal people and the poorer inland people.282 If a broad
swath of the population is aware of the social problems within the
country, it may push China to make real political reforms.28 3 One
conclusion to draw from all of this is that the Internet is still young,
and it will take some time for the Chinese people to utilize its full
potential.284 If so, then those pushing for greater Internet freedom
must have some patience as China continues to develop.
5.0 CONCLUSION
China considers control of the Internet to be very important to
the stability of the country. From the advent of Internet access in
China, free speech and privacy rights online were severely curtailed
to prevent the spread of dissenting viewpoints. The Chinese
government will continue to resist change and create new
technologies or appropriate existing technologies for its own
monitoring and censoring uses. In a country like China, policies and
political views do not shift abruptly. There is hope, however, for a
gradual change based on a number of fronts. There must be
continuing dialogue with CPC officials about the benefits of a more
open Internet and how it will not threaten the stability of the country
or the ability of the CPC to govern in its own way. This dialogue must
come from all sides including the Internet industry, human rights
groups and civil society groups, as well as states and international
organizations. While this dialogue is important, the biggest impetus
for change will probably not come from political discourse but rather
market forces.
Corporations can bring great benefit to society but can also
produce much harm. As corporations grow larger and expand their
extraterritorial reach, the dangers they pose for human rights are
significant. In the struggle for Internet freedom, however,
corporations can play a large positive role. In China, foreign Internet
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284. Id.
FREE SPEECH AND PRIVACY ONLINE
companies have already brought about more freedom to Chinese
citizens and can continue to do so. Internet companies can continue to
invent new and innovative methods of communication and facilitate
the building of a strong Internet community. Foreign companies must
understand Chinese society and what the Chinese want from the
Internet in order to continue building market share and customer
loyalty. Chinese Internet users can then take these technologies and
create social movements, push for change, or increase publicity about
certain events and topics. This will likely pressure domestic Internet
companies to increase their competition and services, leading to an
overall more robust and free Internet.
Meanwhile, the creation of a strong international corporate code
of conduct with participants from around the world can help regulate
the Internet industry in a flexible and quick manner. Hard law cannot
change quickly enough with changing technology, and international
treaties and conventions are too susceptible to global politics. This
ultimate CCC must have a strong monitoring and enforcement system
in order for the codes to be taken seriously and allow for widespread
adoption throughout the industry. The CCC must also be applicable to
various different Internet technologies in order to allow a wide variety
of companies to join. Lastly, the CCC must be unified in its approach
to China and support its members when they take a stance to protect
user rights. Of course, increasing the protection of free speech and
privacy online will not happen overnight. The Chinese experience
with the Internet is still in its infancy. Those pushing for greater
online freedom must have patience as they work with China to open
up the Internet. Just as the Great Wall of China has become
antiquated, the Great Firewall of China may soon, too.
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